Radio Chatter - Comunicaciones de radio en la WWII

[m606paz]

Aqui les dejo unos links donde pueden descargar y escuchar comunicaciones de radio de la segunda guerra mundial.

call_in_artillary.mp3
https://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0ByvMmQ ... NmE3&hl=en

wwii_battlfield_noise.mp3
https://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0ByvMmQ ... MWE0&hl=en

fox46.mp3
https://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0ByvMmQ ... MGI3&hl=en

my_units_on_hill.mp3
https://docs.google.com/leaf?id=0ByvMmQ ... YzZl&hl=en

Saludos

[martinelterrible]

Respondiendo a la consulta de Patricio
Para poder entrar en detalle sobre las comunicaciones en ww2,debemos entender como funcionaban las cosas para esa época,eso nos va a hacer comprender que cada equipo de comunicaciones, de cada país en conflicto, fue el mejor que tuvo para el fin que se diseño en el momento de su requerimiento, y quizás luego demostró no estar a la altura de las cirscunstancias, no por mal diseño, sino por el vertiginoso proceso de cambio que se vivo en esos años.
Tengamos en cuenta que a Varsovia entran tanques PzKp fw-1,2,3 de muy bajo tonelaje, entendamos que un panzer 1 es mas liviano que un T-16 E2;mientras que 5 años mas tarde a Berlin entran JS-2,JS-3,de tonelaje cerca de las 47 ton ,que combatieron contra sus similares alemanes Tiger y KoenigTiger.
Repasemos un poco de evolución del pensamiento militar táctico, para ver como evolucionaron las comunicaciones, y como se llega a lo que se llega.
El hombre siempre, como buen carnívoro que es, maifesto una predisposición a arreglar todo por el lado violento.En un principio era turba contra turba,al mejor estilo barra brava,como decía Duglas Bader,cada uno como puede y Dios para todos.Luego vio que organizándose en el orden de batalla tenia mejores posibilidades sobre el enemigo que si lo hacia en desorden,Ya en el antiguo Egipto 1200 años AC,es interesante leer la batalla de Qadesh, entre RamsesII,y los Hititas.Para el siglo 8ac,ya los asirios copiaron la táctica novedosa de los alemanes de 1939,,atacando con los carros las formaciones de infantería enemigas,con conductor y arquero sobre el carro que diezmaban a los infantes contrarios,y detrás de ellos,explotando la brecha del desbande organizado por los carros, los panzergranadiers asirios explotaban la ruptura.
Por esos años los griegos,organizaron firmemente a la infantería en una formación que duro 2000 años,la falange,o sea grupos de soldados que avanzaban codo a codo en una línea armados con lanzas,en formaciones de varias líneas.
Cuando el enemigo se empezó a organizar,en formaciones similares,se invento la falange, que consistía en fortalecer un ala del ataque de forma tal que cediendo el centro el ala fuerte avanzaba sobre el flanco enemigo y lo envolvía.
Los Romanos copiaron todo esto y lo magnificaron,la organización era la siguiente,diez tipos eran una decuria al mando de un decurión,diez decurias ,o sea 100 tipos era una centuria,al mando de un centurión,dos centurias eran un manipulo,tres manipulos eran una cohorte (6 centurias),10 cohortes eran una Legion.
En la practica,esto no era asi,porque la centuria optima era de 10 tipos de frente por 8 de fondo,si la hacían mas gruesa perdia demasiada flexibilidad ,como paso en Cannaes que atacaron a anibal en formación de 16 de fondo, Anibal ataco en una media luna invertida, dejo ceder el centro de su ataque,los romanos entraron como una cuña en la formación cartaginesa,pero las alas de anibal en media luna invertida,impidieron que la formación de falange romana haga contacto con los flancos y el centro a la vez,el centro cedió,los romanos entraron,las alas laterales de anibal invirtieron la posición y rodearon a los romanos,que en línea de 16 no pudieron replegarse a tiempo..y se acabo el asunto,50000 romanos menos.
El tema es que con estas masas de gente se hacia necesario el control de la batalla efectivo,ya no podía el general responsable estar en el fragor de la batalla,sino que debía estar en una posición donde pudiese controlar ese lio de gente,y la situación se extendió hasta 1850,donde vemos en los cuadros,la batalla al fondo,y en general arriba de una loma,mirando,con su escolta y edecanes,prestos a transmitir sus mensajes al campo de batalla.
Como hacia esto?,en épocas de los romanos las falanges eran de tres tipos;hastati,que eran los mas jóvenes y eran los primeros en entrar en contacto con el enemigo,luego eran seguidos por los principis,que eran tipos de unos 30 años,y entraban en contacto con el enemigo si los hastatis eran sobrepasados,y por ultimo los triarii,que eran los veteranos mas duchos y equipados,que entraban en contacto con el enemigo,cuando todo estaba mal,de ahí el dicho “la tercera es la vencida”,porque los triariis normalmente resolvían cualquier cosa en estado dudoso.
Como hacia el general para manejar esto?,cada grupo tenia una indumentaria diferente,y penachos en los cascos diferentes,por ejemplo el centurión era un cepillo transversal en su cabeza,y asi cada individuo.Cada grupo llevaba un estandarte,y entonces el general,de lejos mirando los colores sabia la situación en la batalla de cada grupo,e impartía sus ordenes,que eran llevadas por el mensajero,al estandarte,por eso la importancia de tomar los estandartes en la batalla,con ello se aseguraba que el enemigo perdia coordinación.
Esto fue asi hasta 100 años atrás,por eso tan vistos eran los uniformes militares,no había que camuflarse, había que resaltar bien asi el general sabia donde estaba cada grupo durante la batalla ,y ser muy diferentes y variados (no eran travestis, era falta de algo mejor),Por eso había húsares, dragones, cazadores, lanceros ,etc;cada grupo hacia algo diferente y era muy notoriamente diferente su aspecto, en particular gorros y cascos, ya que la cabeza es lo que mas se ve ,para poder manejarlo bien de lejos, ya sea mandándolos al ataque o observar que estaba en problemas,estos nombres correspondían a unidades de caballeria pesada, usadas para romper formaciones enemigas o contra caballeria, caballeria ligera, para tomar flancos,asaltar cañones, o perseguir el desbande enemigo etc.
El tema es que desde la época de Gustavo Adolfo de Suecia,que fue el padre de la doctrina militar moderna,se sabe que lo mejor contra las cargas enemigas,de caballeria e infantería,es oponer una fusilería constante y permanente.
La cosa que desde la época de Gustavo Adolfo, la obsecion fue aumentar el volumen de fuego, uno de los primeros pasos lo da un alemán; Dreyse ,que inventa un fusil en 1841,y que es oficial del ejercito alemán en 1848 y se trata del primer fusil de cerrojo, el primer arma standarizada, a pesar de los thebatiere,y otras cosas existentes en otros países, porque los prusianos son los primeros en tener algo que funcionaba, en forma estándar y oficial.
Este fusil, les permitió el triunfo en la batalla de sadowa, imaginate poder tirar con carga rápida y en forma acostada ,o sea dando un minimo blanco expuesto, mientras los austriacos debían pararse para cargar sus fusiles.
Todos los países del mundo observaron esta arma,y generaron las suyas en diversos modelos y formas,…nació la retrocarga,aparecen los snider,remingtong rolling block,chasepot,etc.
A esto le siguió la lógica incorporación de un almacen para hacer mas rápida la carga, y se puso mucho esfuerzo en desarrollar un arma capaz de repetir en forma rápida gran volumen de fuego.
Se estudiaron dos caminos posibles,uno,donde la repetición es mecánica merced a la acción de una manivela o palanca que se encargaba de hacer el ciclo de disparo ,la otra era la repetición automática, utilizando la misma fuerza de los gases o retroceso, del cartucho disparado.
En el primer ejemplo,y también el mas antiguo, luego en desuso, y actualmente en boga, tenemos las Gatlings, nordenfelt,Gardner,hochkiss, y actualmente las minigun etc.
En las automaticas tenemos primeramente quizás la primer ametralladora masiva efectiva,la Maxim,ZB-26,30,bren,bar,dp,dt,rpd,mg-34,42..etc..etc..etc…
Las automaticas se clasifican de tres formas básicas,las “blowback” ,o sea las que funcionan sin el cierre acerrojado, esto es, el cerrojo se mantiene en su posición gracias a su peso y un poderoso resorte;este sistema es valido con municion poco potente, en gral municion de pistola, .22,32 acp,9mm,45 acp,7,63x23,etc ya que en municion de fusil el cierre se haría demasiado pesado,para asegurarse que la capsula servida no sea expulsada aun con polvora en inflamación…o aparece de vuelta en armas pesadas donde el peso del un cerrojo masivo no molesta,como el oerlikon 20mm 1928 mod arg 1938,los 20mm skoda,polsten,o el mismo bofors 40mm.
Luego estarían las automaticas acerrojadas, donde el cerrojo se mantiene solidario al cañon hasta que sale el proyectil, por un impedimento mecanico, que es desbloqueado, según el diseño, por el retroceso del conjunto, que puede ser corto o largo, claros ejemplos por todos conocidos,son la pistola colt 45 mod 1911,donde la corredera y el cerrojo son solidarios hasta que durante el retroceso,la bieleta del caño lo hace bascular y asi descerrojarse de la corredera, permitiendo la expulsión del cartucho servido.Ejemplos de este sistema son:maxim, browning 1917,1919,mg-34,mg-42,parabellum 1913,pistolas luger,colt máuser etc etc etc.
La otra forma es usar parte de los gases de combustión, que son tomados y usados para mover un piston que acciona el desacerrojamiento del arma.Ejemplos son :fal,bar,bren,chatelleraut 1925,hochkis 1914,saint etien 1907,tipo 96,99 (japonesas),dt 28,dp28,rpd,rpk,m-16,ak-47,mag,etc etc etc.
Y por ultimo existe una infinidad de formas de acerrojar:por pivot (maxim,bar,luger),bloque transversal (browning 1917,1919,m2hb),kejelmann (dp-28,dt-28,rpd,),meunier, por cierre calzado (fal,bren,zb 26,zb 30,tipo 96,99),por acerrojamiento giratorio (Benet-mercie,mg-34,garand,m-3,ak,47,galil,aug,m-16),acerrojamiento por cilindros (zb-52,mg-42,g-3) etc etc etc
A que va esta sanata, a que se puso mucha cabeza y mucha plata en lograr volumen de fuego…llegamos a 1914, y aquí entra en escena tres actores insospechados uno es el tren, que permite movilizaciones masivas en cuestión de horas, mas teniendo en cuenta las dimensiones europeas; ya había sido un éxito en 1871,el plan de Moltke de movilización, podía un lunes llamares a las reservas, y que antes del fin de semana estuvieran en situación, desplegadas.Los otros actores,son,la industria de la anilina, que da posibilidades de grandes cantidades de acido nítrico, en forma sintetica, lo que permitió a los imperios centrales tener cantidades infinitas de explosivos, y finalmente, la maquina de coser, quizás uno de los primeros objetos baratos masivos complejos mecánicamente, muy en auge a principios del 1900…lo que permitió que los arsenales tuviesen en vez de decenas de ametralladoras…miles, con la rápida conversión de la industria.
O sea se llega a 1914, con un volumen de fuego infernal, las masas de soldados podían ser enfrentadas por pelotones de ametralladoras, barridas de artillería de 3000 o mas cañones durante días….pero las comunicaciones seguían siendo napoleónicas,por falta de inversión en el tema, no por carecer de fondos, sino por falta de doctrina de comunicaciones por falta de comunicaciones, recuerden las cargas de infantería en Gallipoli, donde a sabiendas de que enfrente había muy hábiles ametralladoras turcas, al mando de Liman Von Sanders, los ingelses y anzacs seguían cargando por falta de contraordenes, ya que el comando estaba embarcado en la bahía, y entre que se avistaban las defensas turcas, se mandaba la información, volvia la nueva orden ,en el medio se hacia la hora del ataque,y la doctrina no permitia esperar la nueva orden, sino que se debía seguir el plan fijado de antemano, sin posibilidad de modificar por el mando local a falta del grado necesario…con un par de radios se habrían salvado mas de 50000 tipos.
La cosa es que el tema de doctrina de comunicaciones estaba en su segunda infancia en los años 20,donde ya todos los ejércitos eran concientes de que se debía tener una comunicación fluida con el mando,dado el volumen de fuego posible,y la rápida capacidad de destrucción,al menos a nivel compañía.
El tema era hasta donde se debía estar comunicado.
Al principio de la ww2,los alemanes organizaban su ataque basados en fuerzas mecanizadas,las que estaban todas comunicadas entre si,entiéndase,al tanque guía,y este al comando,y la infantería avanzaba y ocupaba detrás.
Era necesario darle comunicación a unidades de servicio especiales,cooperación aérea,contracarros,eingenieros etc.Para eso se desarrollaron equipos portátiles con frecuencia variable,en general los canales separados 50kcs,y baja potencia (una radio militar siempre tiene baja potencia)(no nos interesa que mucha gente escuche lo que tramamos),pero tampoco interesaba que estén los comandos muy bajos comunicados,ya que eso,el exeso de comunicación complica hasta hacer imposible el mando,debemos saber todo pero no demasiado,imagínense un ataque de 2000 tipos,que cada 10 hay una radio,o sea 200 traficos de comunicaciones….
Se me cansaron los dedos sigo después…..

[m606paz]

Hola Martin
Hace un buen estiramiento de dedos, y segui!!
Esta interesante el relato!!
Pero me pregunto, para estar en contexto, cual es la consulta de Patricio??

En 10 minutos termina el recreo!!

Saludos

[martinelterrible]

equipos de radio ww2!

[Patman]

Muy bueno el aporte Martin.
Al hilar toda la informacion uno se da cuenta de varias cosas. Me acuerdo que en la miniserie Roma, el Centurion daba ordenes segun movia su cabeza con el casco que vos explicas.

He leido algo sobre equipos para las Fuerzas Especiales que luego traduzco y subo.

Abrazo,
Patricio

[Patman]

U.S. Military Portable Radios
http://www.radiomilitari.com/r.html
Introduction
This is the story, as best I can tell it, of the progress that the U.S. Military has made over the past sixty years in mainstream portable voice communications radios, with a concentration on the later, more convenient-to-use units (i.e. SCR-536/BC-611 and later, SCR-300/BC-1000 and later, i.e. units with integral battery packs). A "Portable" is defined as a unit capable of being operated while a person is in motion. Mainstream is defined as having reached some fair production level.
General Goals
In general, the goals in the development of new radios were, for many years, as follows (some of which are interdependent with, and some of which are contrary to, some of the others).
• Lower Power Consumption
• Smaller Size/Lighter Weight
• Wider Frequency Coverage
• Closer Channel Spacing
• Synthesized Frequency Operation
• Higher Reliability
In more recent years, additional goals have been imposed.
• Internal Comsec (ICOM)
• Data send/receive capability along with voice
In addition, there has sometimes been at least a perceived need to develop radios that operate within more than one band (i.e. the AN/PRC-70, 113, 117D, 128, 138, 139, and the AN/URC-100 series). These radios help "interoperability" with other fighting force elements, as well as communications with local elements when they exist.
The Simple Six
One can group the types of portable radios the Military buys into the following six categories, four of which are tactical and two of which are non-tactical. Not every service purchases all types, nor are all types procured in the same quantities.
• Tactical
1. The Squad Radio, VHF FM (wide band), a small hand held unit for very local communications within ground forces.
2. The main ground force communications device, a VHF FM (wide band) backpack, for longer distance communications than the squad radio can provide.
3. A FAC (Forward Air Controller) radio, generally a backpack, UHF, AM, for communications with aircraft.
4. A Special Forces radio, HF, SSB, backpack/manpack, for longer distance communications than would be provided by the VHF Backpack.
• Non-Tactical
5. SAR (Search and Rescue) radios, originally on 140.58 MHz, then 121.5/243 MHz, then 243 MHz only, and then multi channel, all AM, for downed airmen or other rescue duties.
6. Guard Duty/Fire Rescue/Other Use types, generally Low band (30-50 MHz) or High Band (152-174 MHz), or UHF (450-470 or 512 MHz), and/or the closely associated Government frequencies, narrow band FM.
Recent Trends, Program Management Lead
In recent years, certain trends have been evident. For instance, the Air Force and Army have tended to collaborate and use the same hardware when both services needed the same function. This can be seen in the charts, especially in SAR and non-tactical radio usage. Other trends are as follows.
• The Army has been the Lead in the Squad radio, although the Navy/Marines have contributed heavily.
• The Army is also the Lead in the VHF backpack area.
• The Air Force has traditionally been the Lead in the UHF FAC area with the Navy and Army tending to use what was developed. The notable exception is the PRC-75, which was developed for the Marines only. Additionally, there is little evidence to suggest that the Army has had a need for a UHF FAC radio later in time than the PRC-41 era.
• The Army generally Leads the effort in HF radio development.
• The Air force is currently the Lead in SAR system development.
• The Air Force is the Lead in the Scope Shield program, which is essentially non-tactical, although the Army has the PRC-127 project.

Chart 1 - Ground Force Portable Radios
The style developed in the beginning (battery on the bottom, rigid antenna on the top, front panel controls) was employed for the SCR-194 and SCR-195 for the Army and the TBY for the Navy. These were not really hand held devices, but were intended for backpack use even though they were not built like the backpacks with which we are familiar today. It is a tossup where to put these early units, so I simply put them in the charts with the most room.

The VHF Squad Radio, WWII to Present-Charts 1 and 7
The first units developed that more or less conform to our present day expectations for handheld devices were the SCR-511 and the SCR-536. The SCR-511/BC-745 was designed to be used while riding a horse. However, the cavalry was abolished before WW II, so it would seem it was a bit awkward to use on foot. It was, however, a marvelous example of good applied engineering, i.e. how to design a radio that was operable with just one hand while riding. Therefore, the honor must go to the SCR-536 (along with the SCR-585/BC-721 glider version) for being the first true handheld radio. (Both units were made, in the beginning, by Galvin Mfg. Co, which is now Motorola.) Packing a walloping 36 mW of Tx power, and subject to all the interference the HF AM band musters, it was still more or less a success. The Navy's MAB and DAV were also fairly small units that operated in the same AM frequency band, but not quite handheld.
The Korean War vintage PRC-6 (although there is some debate as to whether it made it through development in time to actually see wartime service), making use of the relatively new sub-miniature (pencil sized) tubes, improved greatly on the SCR-536. A VHF unit with 250-mW output, the FM mode of this unit reduced the interfering noise level greatly.
After a long and drawn out research effort (basically waiting for transistor and integrated circuit technology to develop), the PRC-68 was produced, a very neat little package indeed. There had been an interim stop at the PRR-9/PRT-4, the first all solid state implementation, but they never really saw much use. The PRC-68 was to prove to be the father of 6 additional designs, the 68A, 68B(V), 68B(V)2, 126, 128, and 136.
The 1" longer PRC-68A followed, which was one of the first microprocessor-controlled units. It allowed random frequency programming, but you had to stay within one of the four sub-bands.
The present unit, the PRC-68B(V) (Marines)/PRC-126 (Army) is basically a PRC-68A with a frequency display. In addition, the PRC-126 has external frequency setability. They are microprocessor controlled and allow more latitude in channel placement than even the PRC-68A because they have an external antenna tuning control.

Chart 2 - VHF Backpack
By all accounts, the first true backpack, the SCR-300, was a very successful design. It was followed by the Korean War vintage (although they may have just missed actual war service) PRC-8, 9, and 10 (Armor, Artillery, and Infantry respectively). Using sub-miniature tubes, these offered wider frequency coverage than before.
The PRC-25 was the first synthesized unit, offered wider yet frequency coverage, and had just one tube (RF power output stage). Over 125,000 were produced. The all solid state but otherwise identical PRC-77 followed, with a large quantity produced as well. Tone squelch was introduced during this time period.
The current unit is the PRC-119 SINCGARS (SINgle Channel Ground and Air Radio System). It has an ability to FH (Frequency Hop) in order to avoid jamming. In addition, the "A" model is called ICOM (Internal COMsec). Comsec stands for COMmunications SECurity, i.e. voice scrambling in order to prevent intelligent interception of message content by the opposition. This model also sports a much longer battery life.
Meanwhile, there is an improvement program underway that has developed and purchased a small number of trial radios. The following was taken from the WWW (reference 18).
"The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) SIP (SINCGARS Improvement Program) Compatible Portable Radio, the RT-1753(C)/U, is a compact portable version of the SINCGARS SIP radio. This portable radio will be used along with the Lightweight Internet Controller (LINC) and Dismounted Soldier Unit (DSSU) in TF XXI (Task Force XXI) to support dismounted soldier operations and is designed to operate from a dismounted soldier's vest pouch. The radio replaces the current manpack version of the SINCGARS radio. The portable radio includes all SIP performance enhancements to include additional data mode features, embedded COMSEC, an external RS-232 Data Interface and packet switching for access into the tactical Internet. The radio weighs no more than 5 pounds (with battery and antenna), is approximately 1.9 inches by 10.6 inches in size (with battery) and provides selectable output RF transmit power up to two (2) watts and communication range of 3 to 4 kilometers. The portable radio uses a rechargeable NiCad battery pack. Battery life is approximately 6 hours. The portable radio shall consist of a portable radio, an antenna, and battery pack."
There are a number of instances where the portable RT (Receiver/Transmitter) unit forms the basis of a number of nomenclature systems (i.e. AN/PRC, AN/VRC, AN/GRC, etc.). The RT unit can, for instance, be attached to a vehicular mount that allows it to run on vehicle supplied power. Usually there is also an associated vehicular mounted amplifier that boosts the transmitter power, and boosts audio power as well in order to drive a speaker. Some of these systems even have a "jerk-and-run" capability, i.e. a quick way to disconnect and turn the RT into a portable again.
In a similar vein, there is an older concept where communication devices that have a primary application (mounted in a vehicle perhaps) have also a "Secondary Application" as a manpack (larger than a backpack) portable, or visa versa. These devices, when attached to the correct backpack frame, and when connected to the correct battery box with the correct cables, became portable. The following is a list of these types. There may be others.
• TBX, 2-5.8 MHz
• SCR-284/BC-654, tuneable, 3.8-5.8 MHz AM, replaced by
• SCR-694/BC-1306, tuneable, 3.8-6.5 MHz AM, replaced by
• AN/GRC-9, tuneable, 2-12 MHz AM.
• SCR-510/BC-629, two channel, 20-27.9 MHz FM.
• SCR-610/BC-659, two channel, 27-38.9 MHz FM.
• SCR-619/BC-1335, two channel, 27-38.9 MHz FM.
• RT-70/PRC-16, tuneable, 47-58.4 MHz FM.

Chart 4 - Special Forces Backpacks
There is not a lot of information on early HF units, such as the crystal controlled PRC-52, 62 and 64. There is some evidence to suggest that some or most of the PRC-64 units (Delco) (a Special Forces replacement for the GRC-109) were converted to the PRC-64A variant that had an improved interface to the GRA-71 burst keyer (300 WPM) (see references 6 and 17).
It would appear that the first unit to reach widespread use was the partially transistorized (four tubes) synthesized AN/PRC-47. It is actually a two man portable (the second man carried the separate Silver battery in its case, amongst other things) with quite an antenna system for the occasions when a temporary fixed station is called for.
The all-solid state PRC-74 with its variants 74A, 74B and 74C backpack units followed this.
The dual band PRC-70, born out of the PRC-42 research effort, appeared next. It does not appear that it ever completely replaced the PRC-74. It also appears there are still PRC-47 and 74 units in the field.
The current HF unit is the IHFR (Improved High Frequency Radio) AN/PRC-104, with variants "A" (changed to LCD readout) and "B" (which added provisions for STAJ, Short Term Anti Jam).
Rumored to be on the horizon is the "Joint Tactical Radio."


Special Forces Portables:
It is true that early equipment specifically designed for use by various Special Forces groups are hard to document, however much information has been gathered on both the earliest and latest sets to see their use, with only an interim gap between the GRC-109/RS-1, RS-6, GRC-9, and the WW-II PRC-5.
The first and second radios to be developed for use by any US Elite Force were the PRC-1, and PRC-5. Both Classic Suite Case type radios, the PRC-1 arrived early in WW-II and is responsible for being the backbone of both tactical, and clandestine communication in the China Burma theater, not only by groups such as "Galahad, and "Merrill’s Marauders", but also the OSS Special Operations Group 101. Not the SSTR-1 which has received the credit for this activity. The PRC-5 arrived about mid-war, and while its exploits are not documented at all, evidenced does exist to place it too in the China/Burma Theater.
The BC-611 (SCR-536) was also originally designed expressly for use by Airborne troops. But as we know, it was later used by virtually every service, and every Allied country, in every theater of WW-II.
The third known radio to have been designed expressly for Special (Elite) Forces was the BC-1306 (SCR-694C). Being originally designed for use by Airborne and Mountain troops, it was later pressed into service with all branches of service due to the major shortcomings of the BC-654 (SCR-284). The SCR-284 shortcomings were indeed so great, that semi-experimental versions of the SCR-694 were placed into early service, the BC-1136 (SCR-694AW).
At the same time SCR-694 became available, so too did the TRC-2. Originally intended for service with Military Intelligence, this was a combination of the a standard BC-1306 with it lower frequency twin, the RT-12/TRC-2.
Next came the already described TRC-7 also intended for use by airborne troops, followed closely by the TRC-10. The later was a re-packaged version of the PRC-1, which allowed for a far more versatile operational package. At a glance, it was similar in appearance to the SCR-284 but boasted a much wider frequency coverage, and CW only operation. This radio today remains one of the rarest, and most difficult to document of all military radios.
Somewhere in this mess came the PRC-4, about this radio we know nothing excepting that it was a discized version of the SCR-536/BC-611, also intended for use by Military Intelligence.
The Army was not the only military organization to employ specialized radio equipment for its Elite forces; the Navy too had such equipment even in the early days. However due to the typical secrecy veil that shrouded all naval equipment, documentation of these types is the most difficult of all. Only two radios are known to have seen service with these type forces. The first was the common TBX whose exploits are only now beginning to surface. The second, also of WW-II vintage was the MBM. A suitcase-like radio set design for use by forward raiding parties. It should be noted that the Navy maintained clandestine operations in all Pacific theaters that were rivalled by no other organization foreign or domestic. And lest we forget the vulnerable MAB, or as it is called in it's own manual "the Para-Talkie", being pictured in used by a Para-Marine (though it is unknown whether the radio saw any use with this short lived branch of the Marine Corps). Post-War years saw the Army Special Forces using the CIA's RS-1, and the GRC-9. It was not until late 1962 that the RS-1 would be officially adopted as the GRC-109 and a regular Army Standard Issue item. And then only because of the transfer of operational control of the Army Special Forces from CIA hands back to regular Army. Contrary to popular belief, the GRC-109"A" model was not an adaptation for code burst operation. It was in fact the same radio supplied with a different "Armor" cabinet that was more than twice as thick as the previous model, with a corresponding increase in weight. By the time of the demise of the RS-1/GRC-109 they had nearly all been either supplied from the factory with code burst capabilities, or this feature was added by way of an MWO [Modification Work Order].
Following closely the adoption of the GRC-109 came the PRC-64 in 1965. Again a radio of CIA origin via the Delco 5300. While the widespread use of the PRC-64 in US hands may or may not have been short lived, and is open for debate, it did enjoy extreme popularity in the hands of one of our few Vietnam Conflict Allies, the Australians and their Special Operations Group. With the introduction of the "A" model with enhanced code burst operation, it would appear that all or most previous, models where modified to comply to the newer radio's specs in the same is respect as it's predecessors the RS-1, and GRC-109.
But before this, with its beginnings in question (approx early 60's/late 50's) came the semi-experimental TRC-77. Receiving its TRC designation via WW-II tradition, it too was originally intend for use by Military Intelligence, and Special Forces. However by this time, its intended US constituency had become highly disillusioned with any high tech/new fangled contraptions. It was then relegated to use by South Vietnamese commandos who were extremely active against North Vietnamese coastal installations. We have also recently learned, via this group, of possible Australian use.
The PRC-62, while for some years it was in question whether this radio actually existed, and the few surviving references to it were simple type errors or just wishful thinking. Recent events, again via this forum and our Aussie members have proven not only the existence of this radio, but also it's use by both the US and Australian militaries.
The author makes mention of the PRC-52, and PRC-42. Both of these are new ones to me, and I'm most interested to learn more about them. In the mid 60's to early 70's, a long list of SSB radios were acquired for testing in South East Asia (over 200). Tracing them down has been close to impossible. Every day somebody comes up with another possible candidate. Suffice to say that there were many radios acquired and used by every involved service. Some to the extent they received almost Standard type acceptance. Some familiar names include AVCO, Hughes, Southcom, Hallicrafters, Harris (RF), Motorola, Collins any others.
It should be noted that the use of HF communications equipment by Special Forces tactical units was primarily NOT to provide "very long distance communications", as the layman might understand it. While radios of this type were capable of long range communications when in competent hands, the primary mission of an HF portable in the hands of any front line tactical unit was to provide communications at ranges not possible with VHF FM equipment of the same type. I/E 1-5 miles for VHF/FM types, 5-10 miles for the HF types. These distances generally represent those that the unit in question might be separated from either its next higher Echelon, or companion units. Typical extremely long range communications with this type equipment in Vietnam were on the order of 20 miles max.